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Preemption and Regulatory Failure
David C. Vladeck*
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Titanic sailed on its maiden and final voyage on April 10,
1912, it carried 2,227 passengers and crew; 1,523 perished after it hit an
iceberg and sank in the frigid waters of the North Atlantic shortly after
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Public Representation, Georgetown
University Law Center, and Scholar, Center for Progressive Reform. In the interests of full
disclosure, my views about preemption were formed before I joined the Georgetown faculty. Before
then, I spent twenty-five years as a staff attorney and then as director of Public Citizen Litigation
Group, a public interest law firm in Washington, D.C. During my tenure there, Public Citizen
Litigation Group was actively engaged in preemption litigation, arguing in favor of preserving state
law damage remedies. A number of the cases discussed in this article, including the Supreme
Court's pivotal ruling in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), and the Third Circuit's recent
ruling in Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004), were handled by my Litigation
Group colleagues. I and many Litigation Group colleagues filed amicus briefs or otherwise
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those discussed below. I would like to thank Brian Wolfman, the Litigation Group's current
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midnight on April 15, 1912.1 The Titanic carried sixteen lifeboats with a
maximum capacity of 980 people, thus satisfying, and in fact exceeding, the
then-current maritime safety regulations set by the British Board of Trade.'
The Board of Trade's standard had been set in 1884, when the largest vessel
afloat was approximately one-quarter of the size of the Titanic and other
new "super liners," such as the Lusitania and the Mauretania, which carried
far more passengers than their predecessors.3 The Board of Trade was not
unmindful of this development. In fact, a Board advisory committee met in
1911 to consider upgrading the Board's lifeboat requirements, but took no
action.4 A year later, over 1,500 died.
Now fast-forward ninety-three years to March 2005. Joshua Oukrop, a
twenty-one-year-old college student, is on a spring break trip to Moab, Utah,
with his girlfriend.5 They go for a bike ride, but Joshua soon complains of
fatigue, falls to the ground, and dies of cardiac arrest. 6 Why? Because a
defibrillator implanted in Joshua's chest - a Ventak Prizm 2 Model 1861
manufactured by the Guidant Corporation - had a defect that caused it to
short-circuit and malfunction.7 Joshua was born with a relatively common
genetic disease, hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, which causes erratic
heartbeats and, if untreated, can trigger abrupt cardiac arrest.8 But Joshua
was able to lead a normal life because the defibrillator ensured that his heart
beat regularly, that is, until it short-circuited and failed. 9 Nearly thirty
thousand of these units were sold by Guidant, many after Guidant had
learned of the design flaw and had developed a newer and safer
defibrillator.' 0 The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") had approved
this defibrillator for use in patients with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, but
was unaware of the defect at the time the device was approved or indeed, at
the time of Joshua's death." Ultimately, three years after learning of the
defect, after dozens of other failures (including at least one other death and
several heart attacks), and prodding from the FDA, Guidant reluctantly
decided to "recall" the product. 2
1. See JOHN P. EATON & CHARLES A. HAAS, TITANIC: DESTINATION DISASTER THE LEGENDS
AND THE REALITY 148 (1987); JOHN DUDMAN, GREAT DISASTERS: THE SINKING OF THE TITANIC
12-13, 20 (1988).
2. EATON & HAAS, supra note 1, at 113.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Device Kept Flaw From Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005,
at A1; see also Barry Meier, Repeated Defect in Heart Device Exposes a History of Problems, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at Al.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Barry Meier, Citing Flaws, Maker Recalls Heart Devices, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at Al.
11. Id..
12. Id. "Recalling" a defibrillator implanted in the chest of a patient is different from recalling
other consumer products, such as toys or cars. For many cardiac patients, the risks of additional
surgery to explant a defective defibrillator, pacemaker, or heart valve outweigh the risks posed by
even a defective product. See, e.g., Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Device Kept Flaw From Doctors,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at Al. As a result, many patients rationally may decide not to undergo
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Often a page of history speaks volumes. The tragic deaths of Joshua
Oukrop and the over 1,500 who perished on the star-crossed Titanic offer a
cautionary tale of the hazards of relying on regulatory standards alone to
define an appropriate level of public safety. Indeed, there are sound reasons
why regulatory and tort systems have historically operated in tandem to
place separate, albeit reinforcing, disciplines on the market. When
functioning well, a regulatory system prevents injury and rewards
innovation. But too often there are regulatory gaps that jeopardize public
safety. Since the founding of our Republic, tort liability has filled those gaps
by providing compensation to those who are injured and by deterring
unwarranted risk-taking. But the safety net of tort liability is under assault
by aggressive, and often successful, assertions of federal preemption. That
same battle is likely to be fought over the death of Joshua Oukrop, since it is
a virtual certainty that Guidant will claim that any action brought against it
by Joshua's family is preempted by federal law.
This symposium was convened to address the growing and seemingly
conflicting jurisprudence governing federal preemption of state damage
actions. One way to evaluate the evolution of preemption law is to examine
it through the lens of litigation under the preemption provision of the 1976
Medical Device Amendments ("MDA") to the federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act 13 - a provision that in many respects is typical of express
preemption provisions in regulatory statutes and has spawned a high volume
of litigation. The question raised in cases under the MDA is whether the
Act's preemption provision nullifies state damage actions based on personal
injuries caused by medical devices that are defective, poorly designed, or
promoted in ways that do not alert patients (and physicians) to the risks that
attend their use.' 4 The answer to that question depends on how one reads
the MDA preemption provision. It provides, in pertinent part, that
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any
replacement surgery, but then endure the risk of life-threatening product failure. See, e.g., id. A
young and otherwise healthy patient like Joshua Oukrop would have likely opted to have
replacement surgery. This problem is a recurring one. See Letter from J. Kermit Smith, Chairman,
Supervisory Panel of Trustees for the Bowling-Pfizer Heart Valve Settlement Funds (Jan. 1998),
available at http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY/1998/bjork.htm (reporting recommendations of
an expert panel working under the FDA's auspices on the criteria that should be employed to
determine whether patients with defective Bjork-Shiley heart valves should endure risk of surgery to
obtain a replacement valve); see also Barry Meier, Faulty Heart Devices Force Some Scary
Decisions, N.Y. TIMEs, June 20, 2005, at Al; Ben Harder, Heart Device Recall: For Patients With
Suspect Models, Tough Choices, WASH. POST, June 18, 2005, at HI.
13. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1999).
14. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 474 (1996) ("The question presented is
whether [the MDA] pre-empts a state common-law negligence action against the manufacturer of an
allegedly defective medical device.").
requirement - (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2)
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device
under this chapter. "
Note at the outset that nothing in this statute says, in so many words,
that Congress is seeking to nullify existing state damage claims, which
traditionally provide compensation to those injured through the fault of
others. There are federal statutes that do, in fact, explicitly nullify state-law
damage claims, but they do so in unmistakable terms, and generally provide
a federal remedy in lieu of the displaced state remedies. 16 The MDA is not
one of these rare statutes. It provides the FDA regulatory authority over
medical devices, and seeks to displace inconsistent state regulation to avoid
saddling medical device manufacturers with state-imposed regulatory
burdens that conflict with or differ from those imposed by the FDA.
Despite the MDA's focus on regulation and not liability, courts have
entertained claims from medical device manufacturers that the MDA broadly
preempts state damages claims.17  As the courts see it, the crucial
interpretative question is what does the word "requirement" mean?1 8  The
Act preempts only state law "requirement[s]" that are "different from, or in
addition to, any requirement" imposed by the Act relating to the "safety or
effectiveness of the device."1 9 The word "requirement" could plausibly be
read to encompass only positive state law - that is, commands imposed by
state statutes or duly promulgated state regulations that carry the force of
law. Under that reading, the MDA preemption provision would bar only
state law or regulations that imposed requirements different from or in
addition to those imposed by federal law regarding the device in question.
Or the word "requirement" could be read more broadly to include state tort
and damages law, which, through serial jury verdicts, could also be said to
impose "requirement[s]." Courts have struggled with this question and have
reached differing conclusions.
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve the question in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,20 a personal injury action brought by a woman who
15. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
16. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000) (provision of the Price-Anderson Act federalizing all
claims for personal injury and property damage arising from significant accidents at nuclear power
plants); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-I to 300aa-34 (2000) (National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,
federalizing all claims arising from personal injuries relating to the administration of vaccines); 49
U.S.C. § 40101 (Supp. 2004) (Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, also
known as the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund, which substitutes a federal remedy for the
tort claims 9/11 victims and their families could have asserted against the airlines whose planes were
hijacked); 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1999) (provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 federalizing disputes over certain employment related benefits).
17. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488-89 (1996).
18. Id.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
20. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
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sustained serious injuries when her pacemaker failed.21  Medtronic
Corporation, the device's manufacturer, argued that the MDA entirely
preempted her claims and left her without any remedy.22 In rejecting
Medtronic's preemption defenses, the Court noted that, although the FDA
had generally approved the marketing of similar pacemakers, the FDA had
not specifically approved the design of the Medtronic pacemaker.23 Had the
FDA done so, the Court observed, that might present a more difficult case.24
But the Court did not reach that question. Although agreeing with the
majority's holdings, Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion, concluding
that the preemption provision's reference to "requirements" encompasses
not just state positive law, but, relying on Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
also state common law tort actions that, when enforced through jury awards,
impose duties on device manufacturers.25 Justice Breyer also disagreed with
the observation in the plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens, that
preemption under the MDA would be "rare."2 6
The contours of the Court's ruling in Medtronic are unclear and hotly
disputed, and there has been a flood of conflicting lower court cases in
Medtronic's aftermath attempting to draw a line between those claims
preempted by the MDA and those claims that are not preempted. This
article explores the repercussions of Medtronic, not just for medical device
litigation, but more broadly for preemption cases where the defendant claims
that federal law ousts state law damage actions. It makes four points:
First, the Court took a wrong turn in Cipollone, and it should not repeat
that error elsewhere.27 Congress' use of words like "requirements" in
regulatory statutes should be seen as references to positive state law only,
and should not be read, unless there is an explicit command by Congress to
28Intecneto
the contrary, to subsume state law damage actions. In the context of
regulatory statutes, words like "requirement" should be read in context to
include only specific state statutory or regulatory commands. Indeed, it
21. ld.at480-81.
22. Id.at481.
23. Id. at 493.
24. Id. at 493-94.
25. Id. at 504 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521
(1992)).
26. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 508 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
27. Cippollone, which is discussed in greater detail below, see infra notes 64-76 and
accompanying text, held that certain state damage claims for injuries alleged to have been caused by
cigarette smoking were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act because
common law duties constituted "requirements." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521
(1992).
28. This is not a novel idea. See Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal
Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REv. 559, 559-60 (1997) (taking the same position
and observing that "there is no better illustration of the Court's schizophrenia than in the area of
federal preemption of state tort remedies.").
appears that the Court is trying to put the Cipollone genie back in the bottle.
In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,29 the Court noted that, although
common law rules may qualify as "requirements," that does not necessarily
mean that tort actions based on common law rules are preempted.3 ° Courts
must determine whether the common law duties imposed by state law are
sufficiently direct and prescriptive to constitute "requirements." And courts
must determine whether there was a history of product liability litigation
over the regulated products prior to the enactment of federal law.3 If there
was, as there was in Bates, then the Court thought that if Congress intended
to deprive injured parties of pre-existing compensatory remedies, it would
do so with unmistakable clarity.
3 2
Second, lower courts have too often failed to follow faithfully the
Medtronic preemption rule. That failure, however, may be a byproduct of
the confusion sown by the complexity of the opinion itself. Fairly read, the
rule of preemption developed in Medtronic is a narrow one, requiring that
for state law to be ousted there must be specific and conflicting requirements
for a device imposed by both state and federal law.33 General tort duties do
not suffice, since they do not impose requirements specific to a given device.
Regrettably, some lower courts have found preemption based solely on
specific requirements imposed by federal law, even though the counterpart
state requirements are general background tort and product liability
principles that do not impose device-specific duties on manufacturers. At
some point, the Supreme Court will have to clarify this issue, which
continues to bedevil the lower courts.
Third, courts should be wary of Executive Branch attempts to engage in
"tort reform" efforts in private litigation. The current Bush Administration
has taken unprecedented steps to persuade courts to adopt its pro-preemption
position. In so doing, the Administration has broken a longstanding
Executive Branch tradition of ordinarily providing its views to courts only
when asked and has accomplished an about-face concerning the preemptive
reach of the MDA preemption provision. Worse, by working hand-in-glove
with industry to change the law on preemption, the Administration has given
the public legitimate reason to question whether the FDA is serving the
interests of the public or the industry it regulates. The Supreme Court has
rejected the Bush Administration's effort to re-write the government's
position on preemption under a different statute; 34 the courts should do the
same under the MDA.
29. 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
30. Id. at 1791; see, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (holding that the
Federal Boat Safety Act does not preempt common law tort claims arising out of a failure to install
propeller guards on motorboats).
31. See Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1801-02.
32. Id.
33. The Court in Bates adopted this reading of Medtronic. See id. at 1800-01.
34. See id. at 1801 (noting agency's change of views and giving no weight to agency amicus
brief). It bears noting that the Clinton Administration also submitted an amicus brief reversing the
Federal Highway Administration's view of the preemptive scope of its statute governing railroad
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Fourth, make no mistake about preemption defenses; they are efforts by
industry to shed an important source of market discipline - the threat of
liability for visiting unjustifiable harm on others - a discipline that
regulation cannot itself provide, and preemption claims must be evaluated on
those terms. It is no surprise that industry seeks to avoid liability. What is
important here is that judges reviewing preemption claims take into account
the overall regulatory and liability context in evaluating industry's claim that
Congress intended to remove the discipline imposed by the tort system.
Medical devices are a perfect illustration of the inadequacy of relying on
regulation alone. The MDA was passed in 1976 in the wake of several
notorious failures of medical devices, especially the Dalkon Shield. These
failures had been brought to light through product liability litigation, and
litigation provided the only compensation to the thousands who were
injured. Since the MDA became law, the medical device industry has been
extensively regulated by the FDA. The FDA is perhaps the most capable
federal safety agency, but it cannot exert sufficient discipline on the
marketplace to ensure an adequate margin of safety for the devices on the
market, a fact that the agency, at least until recently, itself acknowledged.3 5
Although the FDA in the current Administration now argues for broad
preemption of product liability for manufacturers, the FDA's ability to
single-handedly regulate the market does not match its rhetoric. Daily front-
page stories about harmful medical devices on the market such as defective
Guidant defibrillators, Medtronic and Baxter infusion pumps, and Johnson &
crossing gates, and the Court similarly gave no weight to the agency amicus brief in that case. See
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 356 (2000).
35. See Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 Food &
Drug L. J. 7, 11 (1997). Ms. Porter, then FDA's Chief Counsel, observed:
FDA product approval and state tort liability usually operate independently, each
providing a significant, yet distinct, layer of consumer protection. FDA regulation of a
device cannot anticipate and protect against all safety risks to individual consumers. Even
the most thorough regulation of a product such as a critical medical device may fail to
identify potential problems presented by the product. Regulation cannot protect against
all possible injuries that might result from use of a device over time. Preemption of all
such claims would result in the loss of a significant layer of consumer protection, leaving
consumers without a remedy for injuries caused by defective medical devices.
Id. The Institute of Medicine has recently voiced concerned over the shortcomings of FDA
regulation of medical devices and has called on Congress to strengthen the FDA's authority in this
area. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, SAFE MEDICAL DEVICES FOR CHILDREN (Marilyn J. Field & Hugh
Tilson eds., Nat'l Academies Press, forthcoming 2006), available at
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309096316/html! [hereinafter INST. OF MED.]. The Institute had been
asked by Congress in 2002 to study the FDA's regulation of medical devices intended for children,
but the Institute's team found so little information on the subject that it decided to expand its review
to all medical devices. The Institute's report notes "shortfalls in FDA performance" regulating
medical devices that "are not specific to children." Id. at 5; see generally Marc Kaufman, Cardiac
Devices May Need Replacing: Guidant Confirms Defects in up to 28,000 Pacemakers, WASH. POST,
July 19, 2005, at D1; Barry Meier, Repeated Defect in Heart Device Exposes a History of Problems,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at Al.
Johnson and Boston Scientific heart stents, raise serious questions about the
ability of the FDA approval process to provide adequate assurance of safety
by itself.
A. Background
Under federal law, the term "medical device" includes a vast array of
products, such as tongue depressors, band-aids, bone screws, hip
replacements, artificial heart valves, in vitro diagnostics and MRI machines
that might be used to support or enhance human health.16  The FDA
estimates that there are over 80,000 medical devices on the market.37
Medical devices are categorized into three classes based on the potential risk
of harm posed.38 Class I devices, like tongue depressors, are subject to only
"general controls" that provide a reasonable assurance of safety.39 Class II
devices, such as hearing aids, are subject to somewhat stricter FDA
regulation. 40 Class III devices - like pacemakers and artificial heart valves -
are used to sustain human life or pose potentially unreasonable risks to
patients. 4' Before marketing a Class III device a manufacturer must submit
a pre-market approval (PMA) application to the FDA requesting permission
to market the device for uses identified in the application.4 2 There are two
exceptions to this requirement. First, any device marketed prior to the MDA
- a "grandfathered" device - is not subject to the PMA requirement.43
Second, a device first marketed after 1976 may bypass the PMA requirement
if the manufacturer can show that it is "substantially equivalent" to either a
grandfathered device or a Class I or II device. 44 Before granting a PMA, the
FDA must make a determination that there is a "reasonable assurance" that
the device is safe and effective for its intended use.45
Prior to the MDA, medical devices were largely unregulated by the
FDA.46 Although the FDA had and exercised the authority to seize
adulterated and misbranded products once they were on the market, it lacked
the authority to require medical devices to be screened by the agency before
entering the market, even though it had possessed that authority with respect
to drugs for decades.47
36. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2000).
37. INST. OF MED., supra note 35, at 63 ("According to FDA, approximately 20,000 American
and foreign firms produce about 80,000 brands and models of medical devices for the U.S. market.
Before they can be marketed in the United States, roughly 55 to 60 percent of medical devices
require FDA clearance or approval.") (citation omitted).
38. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996).
39. See id. at 476-77 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2000)).
40. See id. at 477 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B)).
41. See id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360(a)(1)(C)).
42. See id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)).
43. See id. at 477-78 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A)).
44. See id. at 478 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B)).
45. See id. at 477 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)).
46. See id. at 475-76.
47. See id.
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By the mid-1970s, the perils of this regulatory gap had been driven
home to Congress in a series of highly-publicized and widespread public
health hazards caused by dangerous medical devices.48 Perhaps the most
notorious example is that of the defectively-designed Dalkon Shield
intrauterine device, which had been introduced and widely marketed by the
A.H. Robins Company without FDA approval. 49 Before it was withdrawn
from the market, the Dalkon Shield had caused numerous deaths and
thousands of serious injuries to otherwise healthy women. ° To fill this
regulatory gap, Senator Ted Kennedy proposed the MDA, which he said was
"written so that the benefit of the doubt is always given to the consumer.
After all it is the consumer who pays with his health and his life for medical
device malfunctions."5 1  Prior to the enactment of the MDA, individuals
could and did seek redress for injuries caused by medical devices through
state law damage actions. Indeed, it was the cumulative weight of such state
law damage actions that forced the A.H. Robins Company into bankruptcy.
5 2
There is not a hint in the legislative history of the MDA that Congress
intended that the amendments would restrict the right of injured persons to
bring state law damage actions for compensation.53 To the contrary, the
MDA was enacted to strengthen consumer protection in light of public
health tragedies like that triggered by the Dalkon Shield.54 Surely Congress'
48. See id.
49. See id. at 476.
50. For riveting accounts of the legal implications of the Dalkon Shield debacle, see RICHARD
B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (U. Chi. Press
1991) and MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD
(Pantheon Press 1985).
51. 121 CONG. REC. 10688 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1975) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
52. SOBOL, supra note 50. The Dalkon Shield story also underscores the shortcomings of tort
litigation. Women who sued Robins were subjected to hostile questions by Robins' counsel. See id.
at 13. Robins
would interrogate plaintiffs about their sexual and hygienic habits. Robins took the
position that multiple sex partners, with the accompanying increased risk of contracting
sexually transmitted diseases, were a more likely cause of uterine infections than was the
Dalkon Shield. Attorneys for the company would ask the plaintiff to identify her sex
partners so that these men could be subpoenaed and asked about their medical histories.
Women were also asked to describe their sexual practices ....
Id. Sobol notes that although "[t]he courts divided on whether to require answers to these
questions," the fact that they were raised "dissuaded many women from pressing forward with their
claims (or from making claims at all) and induced others to accept cheap settlements offered by
Robins." Id. Not only was the litigation process forbidding, it also fell short of its promise of full
compensation to those injured. Once Robins filed for bankruptcy, most claimants were left with
little or nothing. Id. at 313 (listing post-bankruptcy settlement values of claims, with proposed pay-
outs of $5,500 for women rendered sterile to $1,000 for women who had suffered spontaneous
abortion).
53. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 490-91 & nn.12 & 13 (1996).
54. See Mark E. Gelsing, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Is Federal Pre-emption a Heartbeat away
from Death under the Medical Device Amendments?, 25 PEPP. L. REv. 647, 653, 653 n.53 (1998)
(stating that with the MDA "Congress desired to protect consumers from 'increasingly complex
concern with the harm caused by defective medical devices did not impel it
to cut-back or indeed erase the remedies available to people injured by such
devices. 5  Congress was well aware of the role that state damage actions
played in bringing the Dalkon Shield problem to light, in forcing a
recalcitrant company to remove a dangerous product from the market, and in
compensating the thousands of women severely injured by the device.5 6
Congress would surely not, in the same Act, have removed all means of
judicial recourse for the victims of future tragedies caused by defective
medical devices, without saying so in the most unequivocal of terms. "' And
indeed, for the first decade or more the Act was on the books, preemption
defenses were rarely asserted by manufacturers and even more rarely
accepted by courts - reflecting the understanding that Congress did not
intend the MDA preemption provision to be a defense to state law damage
actions. "
So why, then, is there an express preemption provision in the MDA?
The answer is straightforward. Prior to the enactment of the MDA, state
legislatures had tried to fill the vacuum created by the absence of federal
regulation. For example, in an effort to prevent recurrences of the Dalkon
Shield tragedy, California had passed legislation requiring State pre-
marketing approval for intrauterine devices. 9 Other states regulated hearing
aides. 60 Concluding that state pre-marketing scrutiny was better than none,
Congress crafted a preemption provision that permitted state regulatory
programs to remain in place until the FDA implemented specific counterpart
devices which pose[d] serious risk if inadequately tested or improperly designed or used' ...
(quoting S. REP. No. 94-33, at 5 (1975) (Conf. Rep.) (alteration in original)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See generally James P. Walsh, Niehoff v. Surgidev Corp: No Preemption of Kentucky Tort
Law Claims by the Federal Medical Device Amendments, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 615, 624 (1998) (noting
that "[f]or many years, the Supreme Court was reluctant to find that federal public safety statutes
preempted state law tort actions to recover damages," and citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
484 U.S. 238 (1984)).
59. See generally Exemptions from Federal Preemption of State and Local Medical Device
Requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 808 (2005) (laying out procedures by which states may obtain
exemptions from preemption under the MDA and identifying state laws not subject to preemption).
See also Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The Courts Run
Amok, 59 Mo. L. REV. 895, 924-25, 924 n.131 (1994) (quoting the House Report on the MDA as
stating that, at the time the MDA was enacted, "[t]he most comprehensive State regulation ... is
that of California .... [The Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 26000-26851 (Deering 1988)] requires premarket approval of all new medical devices,
requires compliance of device manufacturers with good manufacturing practices and authorizes
inspection of establishments which manufacture devices.") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 853, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 45 (1976)).
60. See, e.g., New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 384 A.2d 795, 806 (N.J.
1978) (describing the objectives of the Hearing Aid Dispensers Act of New Jersey and its "pre-sale
testing requirement").
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regulations. 61  Thereafter, of course, FDA regulations would preempt
conflicting state or local regulatory measures.6 2
B. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
As noted, MDA preemption defenses to state-law damage actions were
not frequently asserted until the early 1990s. 63 That all changed with the
Supreme Court's ruling in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 64 In Cipollone,
the son of a long-time smoker who had died from lung cancer sued several
tobacco companies, claiming that they were responsible for his mother's
death. 65 His complaint asserted a number of claims, including design defect,
failure to warn, negligence, breach of express warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and conspiracy to defraud consumers by denying the
public scientific information showing the perils of smoking.66  The
defendants argued that all of Cipollone's claims were preempted by the
Public Health Cigarette Acts of 1965 and 1969,67 which spelled out
warnings for cigarette labels, packaging and advertising and preempted
additional regulation of cigarette advertising by state and local
governments. 68 The Court first rejected the companies' claim that the 1965
Act preempted Cipollone's claim. 69 That Act's preemption provision said
that "'[n]o statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of [properly labeled] cigarettes."' 70  This language, the Court
held, "only pre-empted state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating
particular cautionary statements and did not pre-empt state-law damages
actions.",71
But the Court reached a different conclusion with respect to the 1969
Act. 72  The language in that statute was, in the Court's view, "much
61. See Michael K. Carrier, Federal Preemption of Common Law Tort Awards by the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 509, 552-53 (1996) (describing the
construction and implication of the preemption provision).
62. Congress also authorized the FDA to grant state and local governments exemptions from
preemption; the FDA's regulations implementing that provision apply only to positive law - statutes,
rules, regulations or ordinances. 21 C.F.R. § 808.20(c)(1).
63. See Adler & Mann, supra note 59, at 897-98 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S.
504 (1992) and saying it prompted courts to "reject injured consumers' claims against device
manufacturers on the basis that the claims are preempted" by the 1976 MDA to the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act).
64. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
65. Id. at 508.
66. Id. at 509-10.
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000).
68. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 510.
69. Id. at 519-20.
70. Id. at 518 (quoting § 5(b) of the 1965 Act).
71. Id. at 519-20.
72. Id. at 520.
broader" in two respects. 73  First, the "statement[s]" language was replaced
by the term "'requirement[s] or prohibition[s] ... imposed under State
law,"' and second, the 1969 Act extended beyond "advertising to obligations
'with respect to the advertising or promotion' of cigarettes. ' 4 The Court
then held that the "phrase '[n]o requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly
and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common law;
to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the form
of common-law rules."7 5  In light of that conclusion, the Court held that
some of the plaintiffs failure to warn claims - those that were based on
representations that the companies made in conformity with the 1969 Act -
were preempted, but that other claims, going to the tobacco industries' fraud
and misrepresentation, were not.76
Cipollone unleashed a torrent of preemption litigation, including the
ongoing litigation over medical devices.7 7  Prior to Cipollone, preemption
defenses were a rarity; post-Cipollone, they were routine. As the petition for
certiorari in Medtronic made clear, by the time the Eleventh Circuit issued
its ruling in the case, most circuits, and many district courts, had weighed in
on the question of the preemptive scope of the MDA, and thus the
preemption question in Medtronic was ripe for decision. 78
The facts of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 79 are typical of these cases. Lora
Lohr was in her late twenties when a heart defect necessitated the use of a
pacemaker. 80 In 1987, Ms. Lohr received a Medtronic pacemaker that used
a Medtronic Model 4011 lead, the wire carrying the electrical current from
the pacemaker to Ms. Lohr's heart. 81  The FDA had never approved this
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting § 5(b) of the 1969 Act).
75. Id. at 521. This passage appears in Part V of the opinion, which was written by Justice
Stevens and joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor. It nonetheless
constitutes the holding of the Court on this question. Justice Scalia, in a separate opinion in which
Justice Thomas joined, largely agreed with Justice Stevens' statutory analysis and said that
"the language of the [1969] Act plainly reaches beyond [positive] enactments;" that the
general tort-law duties petitioner invokes against the cigarette companies can, as a
general matter, impose "requirement[s] or prohibition[s]" within the meaning of § 5(b) of
the 1969 Act; and that the phrase "State law" as used in that provision embraces state
common law.
Id. at 548-49 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter,
dissented on this aspect of the Court's ruling. Id. at 534-44 (concluding that general tort law duties
do not impose "requirements" within the meaning of the 1969 Act).
76. Id. at 524-31 (plurality opinion).
77. Cf Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1796-97 (2005) (pointing out that in
the aftermath of Cipollone there was a "groundswell of federal and state decisions" holding that tort
claims against pesticide manufacturers were preempted under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act).
78. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, No. 95-754, at *11-*14 (filed
on Nov. 13, 1995), available at 1995 WL 17013697, citing, inter alia, English v. Mentor Corp., 67
F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 1995); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 1995); Feldt v.
Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1995); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 824 (1993); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 917 (1992).
79. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
80. Id. at 480.
81. Id.
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lead.82 Although the FDA had classified pacemaker leads as Class III
devices, it had never issued a regulation calling for PMA applications for
such devices.8 3  The Medtronic lead had been found "substantially
equivalent" to a pre-MDA device and was permitted on the market for that
reason.8 4 Four years after the pacemaker was implanted, Ms. Lohr's device
failed, resulting in a "complete heart block," which required Ms. Lohr to
undergo emergency surgery to replace the pacemaker.85 Her treating
physician traced the pacemaker's failure to a defect in the lead. 86
Ms. Lohr and her husband brought a state law damage action in state
court raising claims based on defective design, defective manufacture, and
failure to warn.87 After Medtronic removed the case to federal court, it
moved to dismiss the case in its entirety, arguing that the MDA's preemption
provision gives device manufacturers a blanket immunity from tort
liability.88 The district court granted summary judgment to Medtronic.89
The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that some of the Lohrs' claims
were preempted, but that others were not.90 The Supreme Court granted
review and issued what remains the controlling decision on the scope of
MDA preemption. 9' Unfortunately, the Court's opinion is fractured and
stating the Court's holding therefore requires careful attention to the votes
cast by each Justice on each issue. Part III of the majority opinion sets forth
three holdings that commanded the votes of all Justices. First, the MDA
does not broadly preempt all state-law damage actions against medical
device manufacturers. 92 Second, the Lohrs' design-defect claim was not
preempted because the FDA had not issued any design-specific requirements
for the device. 93 Third, a damage claim premised on state-law duties "equal
to, or substantially identical to" requirements under the MDA or FDA
implementing regulations is not preempted. 94
In addition, the Court held in Part V of the majority opinion, by a 5-4
margin, that the Lohrs' manufacturing defect and failure to warn claims
were not preempted - even if they were based on state law duties that went
82. Id. at 493.
83. Id. at 493-94.
84. Id. at 493.
85. Id. at480-81.
86. Id. at 481.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 483.
90. Id. at 483-84.
91. Id. at484.
92. Id. at 494, 497, 502 (majority); id. at 513 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
93. Id. at 493-94 (majority); id. at 513 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Id. at 497 (majority); id. at 513 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
beyond duties imposed by federal requirements for manufacturing and
labeling. 95 The Court looked to the language of the MDA preemption
provision and noted the "overarching concern that pre-emption occur only
where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific
federal interest. '96 The Court also was guided by the overriding purpose of
the MDA, which was to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical
devices intended for human use.97 In Medtronic, the generality of the
FDA's regulations applicable to pacemakers "reflect important but entirely
generic concerns about device regulation generally, not the sort of concerns
regarding a specific device or field of device regulation that the statute or
regulations were designed to protect from potentially contradictory state
requirements." 98 The Court also found the Lohrs' common-law claims not
preempted because they were based on general state-law duties that do not
specifically address medical devices. 99  General duties to use care in
manufacturing and to warn users of possible risks are not the type of
requirements that Congress or the FDA feared would impede the FDA's
ability to enforce specific federal law.'o
Speaking for a four-Justice plurality, the lead opinion also relied on the
MDA's language and history to conclude in Part IV that the MDA
preemption provision was not intended to preempt most, and perhaps all,
damage actions.' 1 The plurality did not decide definitively the scope of
MDA preemption because under the majority's analysis, none of the Lohrs'
claims were preempted.' 02
Justice Breyer filed a pivotal concurring opinion addressing his concerns
with Parts VI and VI of the plurality opinion. 103 In his view, the preemption
provision's reference to "requirements" encompasses not just state positive
law, but, relying on Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,' °4 also state law
damage actions.'05 He therefore did not join Part VI of the plurality opinion
because he was not convinced that MDA preemption of common law claims
would be "rare."' 1 6 He joined fully in the holdings set forth above, including
Part V of the majority opinion, which demands specificity on both the
federal and state side of the preemption analysis.'0 7 In Justice Breyer's
view, the text of the MDA preemption provision reflected basic principles of
conflict preemption, which ordinarily require a high degree of specificity,
95. Id. at 501.
96. Id. at 500.
97. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
98. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 501.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 502.
101. Id. at488-91.
102. Id. at 502.
103. Id. at 503 (Breyer, J., concurring).
104. 505 U.S. 504, 519 (1992).
105. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 508.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 500.
[Vol. 33: 95, 2005] Preemption and Regulatory Failure
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
and he found no conflict between any federal requirement and any of the
Lohrs' claims. 108
Justice O'Connor filed an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in
part, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas.109 As did Justice Breyer, Justice O'Connor took the view that
common law claims can constitute "requirements" under the preemption
provision.10 Although she agreed that the Lohrs' design-defect claim was
not preempted, she would have held that the manufacturing defect and
failure to warn claims were preempted to the extent that they sought to
impose requirements different from those imposed by the FDA's
manufacturing and labeling rules.111 She agreed with the majority, however,
that the Lohrs' state law manufacturing defect and failure to warn claims
were not preempted to the extent that they were based on alleged violations
of federal law.1 2
Post-Medtronic, courts remain divided on the question that the Court did
not reach; namely, whether the MDA preempts tort cases for PMA devices
where the FDA in fact approved the specific device at issue. Some courts,
like the Tenth Circuit in Oja v. Howmedica, Inc. 113 and Eleventh Circuit in
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc.,114 apply the analysis laid out in Medtronic. They
require that a manufacturer show specific and conflicting federal and state
law requirements applicable to the particular device in order to establish
preemption.115 Other courts follow the approach typified by the Third
Circuit's recent ruling in Horn v. Thoratec Corporation, 116 which held that
FDA approval of a PMA constitutes sufficient FDA oversight to trigger the
preemption provision of the MDA. 17 According to the Horn court, "any
finding" based on "general claims of negligence or defective design and
108. Id. at 508.
109. Id. at 509-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
110. Id. at 513.
111. Id. at 513-14.
112. Id. at 514. The Supreme Court has addressed the preemptive reach of the MDA only once
since Medtronic. In Buconan Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001), plaintiffs
injured by surgical screws (Class III devices) brought actions against a consulting firm that had
assisted the manufacturer in obtaining FDA approval on a number of theories, including the theory
that the consultant had made fraudulent representations to the FDA. Id. at 343. The Supreme Court
held that the plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-FDA claims were preempted, not by virtue of the MDA's
express preemption provision, but under an implied conflict preemption theory that rested on the
observation that "the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud
against the Administration," and that the balance achieved by the MDA "can be skewed by allowing
fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort law." Id. at 348.
113. 111 F.3d 782, 789 (10th Cir. 1997).
114. 167 F.3d 1367 (llthCir. 1999).
115. See, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. New Womyn, Inc., 679 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Iowa 2004);
Niehoffv. Surgidev Corp., 950 S.W.2d 816, 822 (Ky. 1997).
116. 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004).
117. Id. at 173.
manufacture - be it by a jury or a court - would necessarily amount to a
state substantive requirement 'different from, or in addition to, the federal
requirements imposed by the FDA.""118  At some point, the Supreme Court
will have to step in to resolve this ongoing conflict. The following
observations should guide the Court's analysis.
II. ABSENT A CLEAR CONGRESSIONAL COMMAND, WORDS LIKE
"REQUIREMENTS" IN REGULATORY STATUTES SHOULD NOT PREEMPT
STATE DAMAGE CLAIMS
The first and most important step the Supreme Court should take to
restore coherence to its preemption jurisprudence is to acknowledge the
error it made in Cipollone."9 The Court should confine Cipollone to its
facts and declare that Congress' use of words like "requirement" in
regulatory statutes is a reference to positive state law only, and should not be
read, unless there is clear-cut evidence to the contrary, to subsume state law
damage actions. 120
The Court took a wrong turn in Cipollone in holding that the reference
to "requirement[s] or prohibition[s]" in the preemption provision of the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) reaches common
law tort actions. There is not a hint in either the language of the FCLAA or
its legislative history that Congress understood that the preemption provision
would nullify any state common law claims - even failure to warn claims
that might arguably be in tension with the Act's dictates. To the contrary,
the provision was included in the Act to "avoid the chaos created by a
multiplicity of conflicting [state and local] regulations," not to deprive
injured smokers of their state damages action remedies. 121
118. Id. at 179. See also Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 585 (5th Cir. 2001); Mitchell v.
Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 911 (7th Cir. 1997).
119. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
120. By "regulatory statutes" I mean enactments that allocate regulatory responsibility between
federal and state governments and assign regulatory responsibilities to federal agencies. Such
enactments include, for example, the Medical Device Amendments, 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2000), which
assign regulatory responsibility over medical devices to the FDA; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000), which assigns regulatory authority over
certain agricultural chemicals to the EPA; or the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1996, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (2000), which assigns responsibility for regulating the safety
features of motor vehicles to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. I use this term to
distinguish regulatory statutes from statutes that are specifically designed to supplant state liability
regimes with federal ones, like the Price-Anderson Act, discussed supra note 16 and accompanying
text.
121. S. REP. No. 91-566 (1969) reprinted in 1970 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2652, 2663; see also H. R. REP.
No. 91-289, at 9 (1969) (stating that the legislation "will prevent a chaotic situation from developing
as different Federal, State, and local agencies strive to exercise overlapping and conflicting
jurisdiction in this regard"). The language of the Act supports this reading. The Act states that its
purpose is to ensure that "commerce and the national economy ... not [be] impeded by diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any
relationship between smoking and health." 15 U.S.C. § 1331(2) (2000). Justice Blackmun argued in
his Cipollone dissent that "there is absolutely no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress
intended to leave plaintiffs who were injured as a result of cigarette manufacturers' unlawful conduct
without any altemative remedies; yet that is the regrettable effect of the ruling today that many state
common-law damages claims are pre-empted." Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 531,
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Nor, as a textual matter, is it at all clear that general common law duties
constitute "requirements." Had Congress intended to broadly displace state
damage actions, the choice of the word "requirements" is "singularly odd,"
particularly since far more precise words, like "remedies," are available.'22
Words like "requirement" reflect an understanding that the state is imposing
specific rather than general duties on the manufacturer. This was one point
stressed by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Cipollone,' which Justices
Souter and Kennedy joined. Justice Blackmun argued that, "[i]n light of the
recognized distinction in this Court's jurisprudence between direct state
regulation and the indirect regulatory effects of common-law damages
actions, it cannot be said that damages claims are clearly or unambiguously
'requirements' or 'prohibitions' imposed under state law."' 12 4 Tort liability
necessarily exerts only an "indirect" effect on a manufacturer's behavior
because,
[a]lthough an award of damages by its very nature attaches
additional consequences to the manufacturer's continued unlawful
conduct, no particular course of action (e.g., the adoption of a new
warning label) is required. A manufacturer found liable on, for
example, a failure-to-warn claim may respond in a number of
ways. 125
It could adopt a new warning label, "dispens[e] warnings through a variety
of alternative mechanisms, such as package inserts, public service
advertisements, or general educational programs," or even decide to make
no changes and "accept damages awards as a cost of doing business.
126
"The level of choice that a defendant retains in shaping its own behavior
541 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The 1965 Act was far more
limited than its successor; it required warning labels on cigarette packaging, but prohibited further
regulation of cigarette advertising by any governmental body. Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965). The 1969 Act banned cigarette
advertisements on television and radio, gave the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") the authority to
impose warning-label requirements on print advertisements, and stiffened the warnings on
packaging. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970).
In light of the broad regulatory authority conferred on the FTC over cigarette advertising and
promotion by the 1969 Act, a preemption provision barring state and local regulation of cigarette
advertising and promotion made sense. See generally Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,
543-46 (2001) (explaining that under the 1969 Act, the "FTC sought a complete ban on radio and
television advertising, a requirement that broadcasters devote time for health hazard announcements
concerning smoking, and increased funding for public education and research about smoking.").
The Lorillard Court found a Massachusetts regulation that broadly restricted the outdoor advertising
of cigarettes preempted by the FCLAA. Id. at 544, 546-51.
122. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996) (plurality opinion).
123. 505 U.S. at 531, 535 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Id. at 538.
125. Id. at 536.
126. Id.
distinguishes the indirect regulatory effect of the common law from positive
enactments such as statutes and administrative regulations."'
' 27
To be sure, given the purpose of the FCLAA - to comprehensively
regulate the warnings appearing on cigarette packaging and advertising 128 -
one can see why the Court might have perceived a tension between the Act's
requirements and a common law claim for failure to warn. But nothing in
the FCLAA prevented the companies from providing additional warnings. 129
Tobacco companies could have made general public service announcements,
underwritten educational programs, or engaged in other forms of advertising
to warn consumers about the risks of smoking, all without running afoul of
the Act. Thus, there would have been no conflict between the federal goals
articulated in the FCLAA and jury verdicts finding that the companies had
failed to meet their state law duties to warn consumers about the hazards of
tobacco use. In the absence of a clear direction by Congress to abrogate
state law damages claims, the Court in Cipollone was wrong to hold that
FCLAA preempted any state-imposed duties other than conflicting positive
state law. 130 Indeed, until Cipollone, it does not appear that the Court had
ever invoked preemption to nullify a state damage action where the effect of
doing so was to leave injured parties without any remedy. ''
The Medtronic Court compounded the error in Cipollone by importing
uncritically the rule of Cipollone into the MDA. 132 The error in Medtronic is
hard to fathom. At the outset of the Court's opinion, it acknowledges that
Medtronic's sweeping preemption argument was "not only unpersuasive, it
is implausible," precisely because it would "have the perverse effect of
granting complete immunity from design defect liability to an entire industry
that, in the judgment of Congress, needed more stringent regulation in order
'to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for
human use."",133  The Court found it "'difficult to believe that Congress
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Other factors may have played a role in the Court's disposition in Cipollone. For one thing,
because the Court's ruling only found failure to warn claims preempted from 1969 forward, its
ruling did not nullify Cipollone's claims based on pre-1969 conduct by the industry. See id. at 524.
Moreover, the Court in Cipollone preserved claims based on "express warranty, intentional fraud
and misrepresentation, or conspiracy," leaving the heart of the case intact. Id. at 530-31. Thus, in
contrast with many preemption cases where a preemption finding leaves the victim without any
remedy, the impact of the Court's ruling in Cipollone was more modest. The plurality opinion in
Medtronic makes this point as well. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487-89 (1996).
131. The only case cited in Justice Stevens' plurality opinion for the proposition that state
regulation can be as effectively asserted through damages actions as positive law is San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmion, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959). Garmon held that the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") preempted state law regulating labor-management relations. Id. But
critical to the Garmon Court's reasoning was the Court's observation that the NLRA was "a
complex and interrelated federal scheme of law, remedy, and administration." Id. at 243. Parties
injured by labor strife have recourse to the National Labor Relations Board, which has substantial
remedial authority. See id. at 245-46.
132. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484-85.
133. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487 (plurality opinion) (quoting 90 Stat. 539 (preamble to the
MDA)).
[Vol. 33: 95, 2005] Preemption and Regulatory Failure
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
injured by illegal conduct,"' and said that it would "take language much
plainer" than that in the MDA preemption provision "to convince us that
Congress intended that result."' 13 4  Nonetheless, the Medtronic Court left
open the possibility that the MDA could "'remove all means of judicial
recourse for those injured by illegal conduct"' where PMA devices are
approved by the FDA. 135
It appears, however, that the-Court is moving away from Cipollone. The
path to put the Cipollone genie back in the bottle was marked, perhaps
ironically, in Medtronic. There, Justice Stevens, the author of the plurality
opinions in both Cipollone and Medtronic, was quite careful to confine
Cipollone to its facts and to give the narrowest possible reading to its
holding. 136
The Court's next opportunity to address whether common law duties
qualify as regulatory requirements came in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine.' 
37
In Sprietsma, Justice Stevens, this time writing for a unanimous Court,
addressed broad preemption claims made by a boat manufacturer, who
contended that the Federal Boat Safety Act ("FBSA") 138 nullified all state
law design defect damage actions. 139 The action was brought by the family
of a woman killed when she fell overboard from the family's motorboat and
was struck by the boat's propellers, which were not shielded by propeller
guards. 140  The FBSA gives the Coast Guard broad authority to prescribe
safety and performance standards for boats to be used for recreational
purposes.14' The Coast Guard had imposed a wide-range of requirements,
but had not required motor-boat manufacturers to install propeller guards,
although it was considering doing so.142  The boat manufacturer argued,
among other things, that the family's claims were preempted in their entirety
134. Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 487-89 (distinguishing Cipollone on a number of grounds).
137. 537 U.S. 51 (2002). There was one intervening preemption decision that addressed the same
essential question, but it was resolved on implied, not express, preemption grounds. Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). In Geier, the Court found a tort claim based on
the lack of an air-bag in an automobile involved in a crash preempted. Id. at 866-68. The Court
rejected Honda's argument that the express preemption provision in the National Highway Traffic
Safety Act preempted the claim, since the provision applies only to a "safety standard applicable to
the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the
Federal standard." Id. at 866-68 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §
30103(b) (2000)). Nonetheless, the Court ruled 5-4 that the claim was impliedly preempted because
permitting a tort claim to go forward would conflict with the Department of Transportation's
decision to provide for a phase-in of air-bags. Id. at 876-81.
138. 46 U.S.C. §§4301-4311 (2000).
139. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 55-56 (2002).
140. Id. at 54-55.
141. Id. at 57 & n.6 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 4302).
142. Id. at 59-62.
by the FBSA's preemption provision, which is similar to that in the MDA.143
It provides that "a State or political subdivision of a State may not establish,
continue in effect, or enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational
vessel or associated equipment performance or other safety standard or
imposing a requirement for associated equipment ... that is not identical to a
regulation prescribed under" the Act.44
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens quickly disposed of the boat
manufacturer's express preemption defense. 14 Observing that the FBSA's
preemption provision applies to state or local "law or regulation," he
concluded that the language of the provision "is most naturally read as not
encompassing common-law claims" because the terms used together
"indicate that Congress pre-empted only positive enactments."' 146 He also
emphasized that this reading of the FBSA "does not produce anomalous
results. It would have been perfectly rational for Congress not to pre-empt
common-law claims, which - unlike most administrative and legislative
regulations - necessarily perform an important remedial role in
compensating accident victims." 1
47
The Court took its most significant step away from Cipollone in its
recent ruling in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC.148 Bates was an action
brought by Texas peanut farmers against Dow, which sold a weedkiller
called "Strongarm," which the farmers alleged severely damaged their
peanut crops in 2000.149 Dow had registered Strongarm with the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in 2000 with a label that stated,
"Use of Strongarm is recommended in all areas where peanuts are
grown."' 150 The farmers alleged that Dow knew or should have known at the
time that Strongarm stunted the growth of peanuts in soil with a pH of 7.0 or
greater. 151  When Dow registered Strongarm for 2001, it sought EPA
approval for a supplemental label to be used in states where farmers
experienced crop damage which set forth the following warning: "Do not
apply Strongarm to soils with a pH of 7.2 or greater."1 52
Under the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA"),'5 3 the EPA has comprehensive regulatory authority over
pesticides, and pesticides. may not be lawfully sold in the United States
143. Id. at 56.
144. 46 U.S.C. § 4306.
145. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 62-63.
146. Id. at 63.
147. Id. at 63-64 (citation omitted). Tellingly, the Court does not mention Cipollone in addressing
the manufacturer's express preemption claim and Cipollone is nowhere discussed in the opinion. It
is cited only once as part of the Court's discussion of the manufacturer's implied preemption claims,
which the Court also rejected. Id. at 69.
148. 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
149. Id. at 1792-93.
150. Id. at 1793.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6-136y (2000).
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unless they have been registered with the EPA. 54 The EPA will register a
pesticide if it determines that it will not cause "unreasonable adverse effects
on humans and the environment, and that its label complies with [FIFRA's]
prohibition on misbranding."' 55  A pesticide is misbranded if its label
contains a statement that is "false or misleading in any particular," or if it
fails to contain adequate instructions for its use. 156 FIFRA also contains a
preemption provision, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), which provides that "[a] State
shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or
packing in addition to or different from those required under this
subchapter."' 57 Dow argued, and the lower courts agreed, that the farmers'
strict liability, negligence, fraud, and breach of warranty claims were
preempted in their entirety. '58
In rejecting Dow's preemption defense, the Court began by noting that
FIFRA's preemption provision applies only to "requirements" and that under
Cipollone, the term "reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes
and regulations, to embrace common-law duties."' 59  Despite this nod to
Cipollone, the Court then distanced itself from, if not repudiated, this core
aspect of Cipollone. The lower court in Bates had concluded that the
farmers' claims were preempted because a finding of liability "would induce
Dow to alter [its] label."' 6° The Court rejected this reasoning because an
"effects-based test" finds no support in FIFRA's preemption provision,
"which speaks only of 'requirements."",16 In language that echoes Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Cipollone and cannot be squared with Cipollone's
holding, the Bates Court then explained that "[a] requirement is a rule of law
that must be obeyed; an event, such as a jury verdict, that merely motivates
an optional decision is not a requirement."
162
154. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1795 (2005).
155. Id. at 1795 (citations omitted). Prior to 1978, the EPA also determined whether the pesticide
was efficacious for its intended use. Id. at 1796. Congress amended the Act to authorize the EPA to
waive data requirements pertaining to efficacy, thus permitting the EPA to register pesticides
without confirming the efficacy claims made on the pesticide's label. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. §
136a(c)(5)). In 1979, the EPA invoked this authority to issue a general waiver of efficacy review,
with only limited qualifications not applicable in Bates. Id. (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 27932 (1979); 40
C.F.R. § 158.640(b)).
156. Id. at 1795.
157. 7 U.S.C. § 136(v)(b). The Court had previously ruled that the Act's reference to a "State"
did not foreclose local regulation of pesticide use. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597
(1991).
158. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1793-94.
159. Id. at 1798.
160. Id. at 1799.
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also id. at 1798 ("An occurrence that merely motivates an optional decision does not
qualify as a requirement.").
115
To drive this point home, the Bates Court added that the fact that FIFRA
"might pre-empt judge-made rules" says "nothing about the scope of that
pre-emption."' 163  Under FIFRA, for a state rule to be preempted, two
conditions must be met. First, the state rule "must be a requirement 'for
labeling or packaging'; rules governing the design of a product, for example,
are not pre-empted."' 64 And second, the state rule "must impose a labeling
or packaging requirement that is 'in addition to or different from those
required under this subchapter. "1
65
The Court then held that the farmers' "claims for defective design,
defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty
[were] not preempted."' 166  "Rules that require manufacturers to design
reasonably safe products, to use due care in conducting appropriate testing
of their products, to market products free of manufacturing defects, and to
honor their express warranties or other contractual commitments plainly do
not qualify as requirements" because "[n]one of these common-law rules
requires that manufacturers label or package their products in any particular
way."' 167 With respect to Dow's express warranty, the Court added that
although the warranty was on Strongarm's label, the "common-law rule does
not require the manufacturer to make an express warranty, or in the event
that the manufacturer elects to do so, to say anything in particular in that
warranty." 1
6 8
With respect to the farmers' fraud and failure to warn claims, the Court
did find that adverse jury determinations on such claims could qualify as
"requirements" if they actually imposed a substantive standard for a
product's labeling. 169 But even here, the Court immediately made clear that
the Cipollone analysis would not govern because of the "rather obvious
textual differences" between the two preemption provisions. 7 ° FIFRA, the
Court noted, prohibits only state law restrictions that are "in addition to or
different from" those imposed by FIFRA, and for that reason, a state law
requirement is not preempted if it is equivalent to, and fully consistent with,
FIFRA's requirements. 17 ' Federal and state laws that impose parallel
requirements do not give rise to preemption. This analysis, the Court said,
"finds strong support in Medtronic," which addressed "a similarly worded
preemption provision."' 172 Invoking Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in
Medtronic, the Court noted that "a state cause of action that seeks to enforce
a federal requirement 'does not impose a requirement that is "different from,
163. Id. at 1798 (emphasis in original).
164. Id.
165. Id. (emphasis in original).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1798-99.
169. Id. at 1800.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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or in addition to," requirements under federal law."' 17 3 Moreover, the Court
noted, FIFRA "does not preclude States from imposing different or
additional remedies, but only different or additional requirements," and thus
the fact that a damage remedy might give companies an additional reason to
comply with the law is no defense to the application of consistent state
law. 174
So far, Bates simply builds on pre-existing preemption law. But Bates'
significance becomes apparent in its concluding paragraphs, which defend
its non-preemption ruling on two grounds never before given prominence in
the Court's preemption decisions. First, the Court found that the "long
history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisonous substances"
buttressed its conclusion that the farmers' claims were not preempted.1
75
The Court cited many reasons why this history was so significant. For one
thing, the Court reasoned that had Congress intended "to deprive injured
parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely would have
expressed that intent more clearly."'176  For another, the history of tort
litigation "emphasizes the importance of providing an incentive to
manufacturers to use the utmost care in the business of distributing
inherently dangerous items."'177  And the Court found it implausible that
Congress considered a "relatively obscure" provision of FIFRA to "give
pesticide manufacturers virtual immunity from certain forms of tort
liability."' 17
8
Second, the Court laid bare and grappled with Dow's policy arguments,
joined in by the United States as amicus, that tort liability going forward,
coupled with EPA regulation, would lead to over-deterrence. The Court
acknowledged that "[o]verenforcement of FIFRA's misbranding prohibition
creates a risk of imposing unnecessary financial burdens on
manufacturers." 179 But that risk was outweighed, said the Court, because
"under-enforcement creates not only financial risks for consumers, but risks
that affect their safety and the environment as well."' 8 The Court added
that "[p]rivate remedies that enforce federal misbranding requirements
173. Id. (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 513 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
174. Id. (emphasis in original). Later in the opinion the Court adds a measure of clarity to the
inquiry on equivalence in a way that tilts the scales in favor of preserving state law. "To survive pre-
emption, the state-law requirement need not be phrased in the identical language as its
corresponding FIFRA requirement; indeed, it would be surprising if a common-law requirement
used the same phraseology as FIFRA." Id. at 1804.
175. Id. at 1801.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1802.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA.. 1 1  State
tort actions "'may aid in the exposure of new dangers associated with
pesticides,"' may prompt EPA to "'decide that revised labels are required in
light of the new information that has been brought to its attention,"' and may
"'provide manufacturers with added dynamic incentives to continue to keep
abreast of all possible injuries stemming from use of their product so as to
forestall such actions through product improvement." 182
These arguments, which carried considerable weight in Bates, apply
with even greater force to the MDA. After all, the MDA was enacted in
response to a massive regulatory failure brought to light by tort litigation,
and there is no hint in the text or legislative history of the MDA that
Congress intended "to deprive injured parties of a long available form of
compensation."' 18 ' Nonetheless, the courts remain fractured on whether the
MDA preempts state damages actions in cases involving products
specifically approved by the FDA. Since no MDA preemption case has been
decided post-Bates, it is too soon to tell whether courts will take their cue
from Bates. In the meantime, however, it is clear that lower courts have not
faithfully followed Medtronic, creating disarray in the interpretation of the
MDA.
III. LOWER COURTS SHOULD APPLY MEDTRONIC'S PARALLEL
REQUIREMENTS TEST
Medtronic establishes a narrow rule of preemption. As the plurality
opinion put it, "given the critical importance of device specificity in our (and
the FDA's) construction of § 360k [the MDA preemption provision], it is
apparent that few, if any, common-law duties have been pre-empted by this
statute."' 184 The MDA preempts state law when, but only when, (1) there are
specific requirements for a device (2) that are imposed by both federal and
state law, and (3) that are in conflict. 85 Generality on either side of the
equation defeats preemption, as do federal and state requirements that
impose parallel and consistent obligations. 18 6 To illustrate this point, Justice
181. Id.
182. Id. (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). One
might question why a history of litigation bears on the preemption question and how specific that
litigation has to be in order to count against preemption. The Court in Bates addresses these
concerns. As to the basic question why litigation history matters, the Court's answer in Bates
dovetails with the general proposition that when Congress "intend[s] to deprive injured parties of a
long available form of compensation," it "express[es] that intent more clearly." Id. at 1801; see also
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984). The history of litigation goes to whether
a preemption ruling would upset settled expectations and deprive injured parties of tort remedies that
had long been available. As to the specificity of this litigation, the Bates Court was careful to
suggest that litigation in the same general area, and not over the specific product, would suffice.
Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1801. After all, the relevant yardstick in Bates was not specific litigation against
pesticide manufacturers for crop damage, but was instead the more general "history of tort litigation
against the manufacturers of poisonous substances." Id.
183. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1792.
184. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 502 (1996) (plurality opinion).
185. See id. at 506-07.
186. See id. at 502, 507.
118
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Breyer offered the example of a federal requirement that hearing aid wires
be two inches in length, preempting a common-law claim based on a specific
state requirement for a one-inch wire.' 87  Under those circumstances,
compliance with both federal and state requirements would be impossible
and thus preemption makes sense. The existence of conflicting requirements
is the essence of the preemption holding in Medtronic, as Justice Breyer's
illustration makes plain. Regrettably, some lower courts have failed to
adhere to this rule. 1
88
Typical of the decisions that have strayed from Medtronic is the Third
Circuit's ruling in Horn v. Thoratec Corporation.1"9 Horn involved the
failure of a device called the HeartMate, which "is a pump that assists the
blood flow between the heart's ventricle and the aorta in patients with
cardiac conditions."'' 90 Barbara Horn's husband, Daniel Horn, suffered a
heart attack and his doctors determined that he needed a heart transplant.' 91
While waiting for a suitable donor heart to become available, Mr. Horn's
condition deteriorated and a HeartMate was implanted in him to provide
circulatory support. 19 2  He "began to bleed from the spot where the
HeartMate" had been implanted and underwent exploratory surgery that
revealed that the pump had become disconnected. '9 The disconnection had
allowed an air embolus to travel to Mr. Horn's brain, causing a fatal brain
hemorrhage. 1
94
Ms. Horn alleged that the HeartMate was defectively designed and
manufactured, and that the company had failed to warn patients and
physicians of the defects. 9' The district court dismissed the action in its
entirety on preemption grounds, and the Third Circuit, in a two-to-one
ruling, affirmed. 1
96
The majority first found that the pre-marketing approval (PMA) process,
in which the FDA approves the design of Class III medical devices,
culminated in the imposition of federal "requirements."' 97 This ruling was
187. Id. at 504 (Breyer, J., concurring).
188. Compare, e.g., Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., Ill F.3d 782, 789 (10th Cir. 1997), and Goodlin v.
Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (conducting the Medtronic preemption inquiry and
finding no preemption), with Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004), Martin v.
Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2001), and Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 911
(7th Cir. 1997) (looking only at the specificity of the federal requirements and finding preemption
notwithstanding the generality of the state requirements at issue).
189. 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004).
190. Id. at 164.
191. Id. at 165.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 164.
197. Id. at 171.
in error. Obtaining a license to sell a product - even through a process as
rigorous as FDA PMA review - does not result in the imposition of a
federal "requirement."'' 98 Unless the FDA has set out specific regulations
specifying the design standards for a particular device (which is almost
invariably not the case) the manufacturer may select the design,
manufacturing, fabrication and labeling features that will satisfy the
minimum and general standards set forth in the MDA and its implementing
regulations.'99 The FDA's job is to ensure that there is a "reasonable
assurance" that the resulting product is safe and effective for its intended
use. 200 The FDA plays no initiating role in the design of medical devices or
how they are manufactured or labeled. 20 1  Nor does the FDA have the
authority to determine whether the design is optimal from a public health
standpoint, or even whether there are safer and more effective devices
already on the market.2 0 2 So long as a device meets the statutory standards,
the FDA has no choice but to approve it. This point is critical, but it is
generally overlooked. 203
Not only was the Horn court wrong to find "requirements" on the
federal side of the equation, it compounded its error by concluding that state
common law duties are sufficiently specific to the HeartMate to trigger
preemption. 204 As the Horn court saw it, although the Medtronic
plurality opinion did not inform us of when common law
requirements may become substantive requirements, we are
satisfied that Horn's general state law claims would impose
substantive requirements on [the manufacturer] that would conflict
with, or add to, the requirements imposed by the FDA involved in
the design, manufacturing, fabrication and labeling of the
HeartMate.2 °5
Key to the court's conclusion was its assumption that a design defect
liability finding against the company "unquestionably would require" it to
redesign its product along the line advocated by Horn's experts. 20 6 But that
assumption confuses the imposition of a device-specific requirement that
comes through positive state enactments and the indirect effect of tort
198. See 21 C.F.R. § 812.2 (2005) (discussing the applicability of the FDA requirements).
199. See generally 21 C.F.R. §§ 812, 814 (2005) (laying out the federal regulations and procedure
for medical devices).
200. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2000).
201. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d).
202. Id.
203. Id. These limitations on its authority place the FDA in a vastly different position than, for
instance, the Defense Department when it contracts for the production of military equipment. See,
e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (creating federal common law immunity
from tort liability for contractor who produced, according to government specifications, a helicopter
for the United States Marine Corps).
204. See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004).
205. Id. at 176.
206. Id.
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judgments. 2 7 An adverse jury ruling in Horn would not have required the
device's manufacturer to do anything at all, other than to pay money
damages. Of course, a manufacturer might decide to take measures to avoid
a recurrence of the device's failure that lead to Mr. Horn's death or to better
inform physicians and patients of the risks associated with the device. But
the manufacturer could also decide to do nothing, reasoning that the
likelihood of recurrence is too remote to justify any change in the product's
design, manufacture, or labeling.
Horn cannot be squared with the Court's more recent preemption
jurisprudence, which makes clear that jury verdicts are generally not
sufficiently prescriptive to impose "requirements" for preemption purposes.
This point was pivotal in both Sprietsma and Bates. In Sprietsma, the Court
rejected the manufacturer's argument that a jury award based on the finding
that motor-boats lacking propeller guards were defectively designed would
force it to install guards, notwithstanding the Coast Guard's failure to
require them. 208 And in Bates the Court rejected Dow's contention that a
finding that Stongarm was negligently designed and marketed in areas with
soil with pH levels of above 7.2 would necessarily force it to modify labels
the EPA had approved. 20 9 As Bates drives home, "an event, such as a jury
verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a requirement. 210
It may be that lower courts will begin to interpret Medtronic through the
lens provided by Bates and Sprietsma and become more discerning in
reviewing preemption claims. But there is reason to think that they will not.
As part of his "tort reform" campaign, President George W. Bush has
pressed Executive Branch agencies to push for broad interpretations of
preemption provisions in regulatory statutes. 211  The FDA has been on the
207. Id. at 184 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (noting that "[i]t is true that Horn's cause of action may
have the indirect consequence of holding the HeartMate to a higher standard than does the FDA, but
this consequence is sanctioned by Part V of the (Medtronic v.] Lohr opinion and not expressly barred
by Justice Breyer's concurrence.").
208. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65-67 (2002).
209. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1799 (2005).
210. Id.
211. See Margaret H. Clune, Stealth Tort Reform: How the Bush Administration 's Aggressive Use
of the Preemption Doctrine Hurts Consumers, Center for Progressive Regulation White Paper 403
(Oct. 2004) at 7-9, available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/preemption.pdf
(arguing that the Bush Administration has pursued tort reform through legal means largely hidden
from public view rather than through asking Congress to change the laws). As a Scholar with the
Center, I assisted Ms. Clune in the preparation of that White Paper.
It bears noting that the Administration's pro-preemption campaign is not limited to the FDA.
Two illustrations should suffice. First, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has been
roundly criticized for issuing a regulation that broadly preempts state consumer-protection laws
enacted to curb an epidemic of predatory lending. Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted
Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2274, 2275 (2004) (arguing
that the agency, in promulgating its regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(2004), "overstepped its
congressionally delegated authority" and urging courts "to strike it down in order to leave space for
front line of this campaign, both reversing its longstanding view that the
MDA preemption provision applies only in exceptional circumstances, and
aggressively presenting its new pro-preemption views in court. 2  In Horn,
for instance, the FDA filed an amicus brief strongly supporting the
manufacturer's position, and the court relied heavily on the FDA's views in
holding Ms. Horn's claims preempted. 13 Just as the Supreme Court rejected
the Bush Administration's effort to reverse the long-held government
position on the preemptive scope of FIFRA, so too should lower courts be
skeptical of the FDA's new pro-preemption campaign.
IV. COURTS SHOULD REJECT THE FDA'S PRO-PREEMPTION PUSH
Like most federal agencies, the FDA has historically resisted becoming
enmeshed in private products liability litigation.214 Although the FDA has
on occasion provided the courts with its view on the meaning of the statutes
it enforces and the regulations it has promulgated, it rarely sought to inject
itself into private litigation, that is, until the administration of President
George W. Bush.21 5  Since then, the FDA has accomplished a complete
transformation of its position on the preemptive scope of the MDA and has
actively solicited guidance from pharmaceutical and medical device firms
about pending lawsuits in which the FDA could participate to press its pro-
preemption position.21 6 At last count, the FDA has asked for leave to
participate as an amicus in at least four cases, and in each case, it has urged
the court to find the plaintiffs' state law damage claims preempted.
2 1 7
state legislatures and Congress to develop and test novel responses to the growing problem of
abusive lending"). Second, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, taking its cue from
Geier, see supra note 137, has argued that the auto safey regulations it is developing should broadly
preempt state damage actions. See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush
Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49223, 49245 (Aug. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571)
(proposing regulation to upgrade the agency's safety standard on roof crush resistance and
suggesting the new standard, if adopted, will preempt state damage actions); Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards; Designated Seating Positions and Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, 70 Fed. Reg.
36,094, 36,094, 36,102 (June 22, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571.3) (proposing regulation
to amend the definition of "designated seating position," to revise requirements for anchoring seat
beats, "to establish a new procedure for determining the number of designated seating positions on
bench and split bench seats;" suggesting that the new standard, if adopted, will preempt state damage
actions).
212. See Horn, 376 F.3d at 177-80.
213. Id.
214. See Clune, supra note 211, at 1-3.
215. See generally Clune, supra note 211.
216. In an FDA publication, the FDA's Chief Counsel, Daniel E. Troy, announced that the FDA
would "participate in product liability lawsuits brought under state law as necessary to safeguard [the
agency's] considerable expertise in regulating the content of drug labeling and advertising." Daniel
E. Troy, FDA Involvement in Product Liability Lawsuits, UPDATE, Jan-Feb. 2003, at 7-8. Mr. Troy
repeated that comment to an audience of several hundred lawyers representing the drug and medical
device industries, where he urged the attendees to suggest lawsuits in which the agency might
intervene. Mr. Troy apparently cautioned the attendees that the FDA "can't afford to get involved in
every case," so interested attorneys should, in their dealings with the FDA, "make it sound like a
Hollywood pitch." See Affidavit of Jessica R. Dart, 5, Dusek v. Pfizer, No. H-02-3559, 2004 WL
2191804 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004)).
217. Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 2004); Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham
Consumer Healthcare, 88 P.3d I (Cal. 2004); In re Paxil Litigation, 2002 WL 31375497 (C.D. Cal.
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There is no dispute that the FDA's new position on the scope of the
MDA preemption provision represents a 180-degree shift of position for the
agency. In Medtronic itself, the FDA took the position that the scope of the
MDA preemption provision was quite narrow and was not intended to
displace state tort law remedies. 218 More significant, however, is an FDA
amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General in Smith Industries Medical
Systems, Inc. v. Kernats, in response to a request from the Supreme Court.2" 9
In Kernats, the Solicitor General rejected the suggestion that the pre-market
approval process preempts remedies for injuries caused by a defective
medical device, arguing that neither federal nor state law impose
requirements specific to the medical device at issue. 22° On the federal side,
preemption occurs only when "the FDA determines that precise design,
manufacturing, or labeling specifications are necessary [and it] ... impose[s]
such requirements through the promulgation of specific regulations.... We
have been informed by the FDA that it imposes such specific requirements
on Class III devices only in extraordinary situations," that were not present
in the case.2 2 On the state side of the ledger, the MDA preemption
provision is "inapplicable in the circumstances of this case because [the
manufacturer] has not shown that common law imposes a substantive
requirement specifically with respect to the medical device at issue here., 222
Those observations would have applied precisely to the circumstances in
Horn, and indeed universally in the MDA preemption cases decided post-
Medtronic.
223
2002); Murphree v. Pacesetter, et. al., No. 005429-00-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2003), as Ex. A in
Mem. in Supp. of Mot. Summ. J., Downes v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 05-80746, at 3 (D. Fla. 2005).
Although the FDA did not initiate its participation in Horn v. Thoratec, the Third Circuit requested
that it submit a brief after the Horn defendant submitted the FDA's briefs in Murphee and urged the
Third Circuit to defer to the pro-preemption position outlined in the Murphee briefs. Horn, 376 F.3d
at 171 & n. 13. In Motus and Dowhal, the FDA argued for broad preemption of failure to wam
claims with respect to pharmaceutical products, even though the drug provisions of the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) do not contain an express preemption provision, and even though the
courts had not previously entertained such claims. See Brief of Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Cross-Appellee at 13, Motus v. Pfizer, 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-
55498), 2003 WL 22716063, at * 13 (arguing that "since enactment of the FDCA 65 years ago, no
reported decision has held that the Act preempts common-law damages actions with respect to
drugs."). The Court in Motus did not reach the preemption question. Motus, 358 F.3d at 660.
218. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents/Cross-Petitioner,
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886), 1996 WL 118035 (arguing for
a narrow reading of the MDA preemption provision).
219. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Smith Indus. Med. Sys. v. Kernats, 669 N.E.2d
1300 (111. App. 1996) (No. 96-1405) [hereinafter Brief for the United States, Kemats]. The lower
court opinion is set forth at 669 N.E.3d 1300 (I11. App. 1996).
220. Id.
221. Brief for the United States, Kemats, supra note 219, at 15.
222. Id. at 17.
223. Shortly after the Court handed down its decision in Medtronic, FDA Chief Counsel Margaret
Porter noted that the Court's non-preemption ruling in Medtronic was consistent with the FDA's
Notwithstanding the clarity of the FDA's position in Kernats and the
absence of any change in the law - statutory, regulatory, or decisional -
that might explain a reversal of field, the FDA now takes the diametrically
opposite position. Relying principally on policy arguments, the agency
claims that the MDA broadly preempts state-law damage claims not "only in
extraordinary situations," but indeed in every instance where the device has
received pre-market approval by the FDA.224 The fact that the FDA's
position would leave injured consumers without a remedy is apparently not a
matter of concern. According to the FDA, "[s]tate common law tort actions
threaten the statutory framework for the regulation of medical devices,"
because tort relief in the form of damage awards could pressure
manufacturers to alter the device's design or to add wamings the FDA had
not approved. 225 The FDA also warned that "individualized redetermination
of the benefits and risks of a product" in tort cases could harm the public
health by "resulting in scientifically unsubstantiated warnings and
underutilization of beneficial treatments. 2 26 These are the arguments that
the FDA made in Horn, and they were endorsed by the panel majority.227
Courts should be leery of the FDA's pro-preemption campaign for three
reasons. First, simply as a matter of administrative law, courts owe no
deference to the agency's current view of the law, especially when it
contradicts an interpretation the agency has held for more than twenty years
and is reflected in a substantive agency regulation. 2 8 Indeed, the Supreme
Court recently rejected a similar effort by the Bush Administration to reverse
field on a preemption issue but nonetheless claim that its new position is
entitled to deference. 29 In Bates, the Court noted that the Administration
"longstanding... presumption against preemption." Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA
Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7, at 7, 10 (1997). Ms. Porter added
[g]iven the harsh implications of foreclosing all judicial recourse for consumers injured
by defective medical devices, FDA does not believe that Congress intended to effect so
sweeping change without even a comment. Rather, the agency believes that Congress
intended to restrict preemption to positive enactments (for example, legislation or
regulations) that apply to the marketing of medical devices within a state, and did not
intend to preempt state tort remedies for injury to individual consumers.
Id. at 9.
224. Brief for the United States, Kernats, supra note 219, at 15.
225. Horn, 376 F.3d at 177-78 (quoting Letter Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, at 25-26,
2004 WL 1143720).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 177-80.
228. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228-32 (2001). Mead gives new
weight to the rule that courts owe substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute set
forth in a regulation promulgated after notice and comment rulemaking. In contrast, Mead cautioned
courts against giving deference to agency interpretations arrived at through less formal means. Id. at
234-35. Post-Mead, a court confronted with the FDA's current position on preemption would be
bound to defer to the agency's regulation, which remains on the books, and may be modified or
rescinded only through a formal rulemaking that addresses the comments submitted by interested
parties. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2000) (defining "rulemaking" as the "agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule").
229. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
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had changed its position on the preemptive scope of FIFRA, and gave no
weight to the pro-preemption arguments in the agency's brief.
230
Second, and more fundamentally, the FDA's new position cannot be
squared with its long-standing preemption regulation, which the agency has
not amended. The FDA's existing regulation states that preemption is
limited to instances in which the FDA "has established specific counterpart
regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular
device" or class of devices. 23' The regulation also provides that the MDA
"does not preempt State or local requirements of general applicability where
the purpose of the requirements relates either to other products in addition to
devices.., or to unfair trade practices in which the requirements are not
limited to devices., 23 2 The FDA has never questioned the continued validity
of this regulation, but it has also never explained how its views can be
reconciled with it. Perhaps for good reason. The thrust of the regulation, as
the Court recognized in Medtronic and as the Solicitor General explained in
Kernats, is to ensure that preemption occurs only when there are
inconsistent, device-specific requirements imposed by both the FDA and the
state - an occurrence that is an exception, not the rule, as the FDA now
claims.233
Third, there is a serious cost to the FDA's pro-preemption campaign that
should be considered as well. The press has covered the FDA's campaign
extensively, questioning whether an agency that takes extraordinary
measures to insulate from liability the industry it is supposed to regulate best
serves the public's interest. 234 From this perspective, the FDA's campaign
230. Id. at 1794n.7, 1801.
231. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d).
232. Id. at § 808.1(d)(1).
233. The only effort the FDA makes to defend its pro-preemption provision in light of its
regulation is to claim that pre-market approval constitutes a specific federal requirement because
once approved, the device's "attributes are fixed in place, as they can be materially changed only
with FDA approval." See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 19-17, Horn v. Thoratec, Inc.,
376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-4597), 2004 WL 1143720. But this argument is a non-starter.
The same was true of the grandfathered device in Medtronic, and indeed all Class IIl medical
devices; once approved by the FDA, a manufacturer may not alter a device's design without FDA
approval. 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.81(a)(3)(1), 814.39(a) (2005).
234. The FDA's campaign to intervene in product liability litigation on behalf of medical device
and pharmaceutical manufacturers has been widely covered in the press. For a representative
sampling of articles, see, for example, Clune, supra note 211, at I n. I (citing Robert Pear, In a Shift,
Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2004, at A 1; Robert Cohen, FDA Stepping
Into Liability Lawsuits on Side of Drug Makers it Regulates, THE SEATTLE TIMES, May 11, 2004, at
Al; Patrick McGann, FDA's Chief Lawyer Stands Up for the Big Guys, LEWISTON MORNING
TRIBUNE, July 31, 2004, at 10A; Anne C. Mulkern, Watchdogs or Lapdogs? When Advocates
Become Regulators President Bush Has Installed More Than 100 Top Officials Who Were Once
Lobbyists, Attorneys or Spokespeople for the Industries They Oversee, THE DENVER POST, May 23,
2004, at Al; Gary Young, FDA Strategy Would Pre-empt Tort Suits: Does it Close Off Vital Drug
Data?, NAT. L.J., Mar. 1, 2004). Members of Congress were also troubled by the FDA's efforts to
support industry in preemption cases. Representative Maurice Hinchey (D - NY) introduced
was not well-timed. In the past few years, the FDA has experienced perhaps
its worst period of regulatory failure with medical devices. The irony is
palpable. The FDA's pro-preemption story is that the FDA is perfectly
capable of ensuring, single-handedly, safe and effective medical devices.
Imposing tort liability on medical device manufacturers, the FDA argues,
interferes with the agency's ability to protect the public health because the
FDA alone should define the duties that device manufacturers must live up
to. But the agency's shift in position has coincided with a stream of highly
publicized recalls of defective medical devices, including stents,
pacemakers, defibrillators, and infusion pumps.235 These defective products
have exacted a serious toll on public health, and the publicity attending their
removal from the market has undermined public confidence in the agency.
This experience has shown that the FDA's rhetoric does not match its
record. Regulation alone is far from an adequate guarantee of safety, which
is why Congress did not intend to nullify state damages law when it enacted
the MDA.
V. PREEMPTION IN A TIME OF REGULATORY FAILURE
In the debate over MDA preemption, the medical device industry is
fighting to shed a discipline that state tort law imposes on its conduct and to
avoid financial accountability for its mistakes.2 36  Tort liability serves two
legislation to cut $500,000 from the budget of the FDA's Chief Counsel's office; the amount Rep.
Hinchey estimated the FDA spent supporting industry in preemption litigation. 150 CONG. REC.
H5598 (daily ed. July 13, 2004) (remarks of Rep. Hinchey).
235. See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Boston Scientific Expands Recall of Troubled Stent, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2004, at C5 (recall of over 100,000 of Boston Scientific stents); Barnaby J. Feder, J. & J.
Recalls 300 Heart Stents After Defects Are Found in 6, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.14, 2005, at C5 (recall of
over 300 Johnson & Johnson stents); Ben Harder, Heart Device Recall; For Patients With Suspect
Models, Tough Choices, WASH. POST, June 28, 2005, at F1 (reporting effects of recall of nearly
50,000 Guidant defibrillators and over 100,000 Medtronic defibrillators); Ashley M. Heher, Guidant
Recalls Heart Devices; Defibrillator Supplier Cites Malfunction Risk, WASH. POST, June 18, 2005,
at DI (reporting same recall of Guidant Defibrillator); Barry Meier, Pacemakers by Guidant Have
Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2005, at C1 (recall of nine other models of Guidant defibrillators);
Company Recalls Blood Vessel Devices, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2005, at C1 (recall of Boston
Scientific vascular grafts); Associated Press, Guidant Issues Second Defibrillator Warning, L.A.
TIMES C3, (June 25, 2005) (Guidant recall of defibrillators); Reuters, FDA Classifies Recall by
Guidant as Serious, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2005, at C3 (Guidant's defibrillator recall classified as
most dangerous type by FDA); Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Orders Recall ofIntravenous Pumps, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A12 (Baxter Healthcare recall of all of its Colleague Volumetric Infusion
Pumps because they may shut down unexpectedly); Class I Recall Issued For Baxter Infusion
Pumps, 2 FDAnews Device Daily Bulletin (No. 144, July 22, 2005); Medtronic Recalls Faulty Drug
Infusion Pumps in UK, 31 Devices & Diagnostics Letter (No. 24, June 14, 2004) (Medtronic
infusion pumps recalled due to possible software problems); Recalls Continue to Plague Guidant 's
CRM Line, 32 Devices & Diagnostics Letter (No. 30, Aug. 1, 2005) (Guidant recalled twenty
models of defibrillators and pacemakers).
236. See Robert J. Katerberg, Patching the "Crazy Quilt" of Cipollone: A Divided Court Rethinks
Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1440, 1495 &
n.343 (1997) (noting that "[tihe medical products industry has unsuccessfully lobbied Congress for
legislation that would directly immunize manufacturers who complied with federal standards from
products liability lawsuits."); see also Valerie Watnick, Federal Preemption of Tort Claims Under
FIFRA: The Erosion ofA Defense, 36 MICH. J.L. REFORM 419, 441 (2003) (explaining that "one of
the congressional purposes of the MDA had been to reign in an industry in need of more, not less,
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important and related functions unserved by regulation: tort liability
compensates those injured by products found to impose an unjustified risk
and, in so doing, it deters excessive risk-taking by forcing the risk-taker to
absorb the costs that come with marketing a product that imposes an
unjustifiable risk of harm. Because the functions served by tort law are a
complement to, but not a substitute for, the functions served by regulation,
the burden on proponents of preemption to demonstrate that Congress
intended to remove the discipline of the tort system imposes should be high.
For garden-variety regulatory statutes like the MDA, which assign
regulatory primacy to federal agencies but do not address liability, that
burden should be virtually insurmountable.
Once again, the MDA is a paradigmatic case. The idea that Congress,
when it enacted the MDA, intended to displace tort law altogether is hard to
reconcile with a number of considerations that are too often overlooked in
MDA preemption litigation:
First, nothing in the MDA says that Congress intended to deprive
consumers injured by defective medical products compensation. Unlike
statutes like the Price-Anderson Act, the Vaccine Act, or the 9/11
Compensation Fund, the MDA provides neither a federal right of action nor
a system of compensating injured parties. 237  A finding of preemption
simultaneously immunizes industry for its errors and deprives injured
consumers of compensation that historically has been available.
Second, there is no preemption of state damage claims under the drug
provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, to which the MDA is an
amendment. 238  Had Congress wanted to make such a dramatic change to
existing law, it would have said SO.
2 39
Third, although it is generally referred to as a public health statute, the
MDA is not designed to optimize public health. It is a licensing statute that
trades off public health imperatives for the benefit of medical device
manufacturers, as is illustrated by the following examples:
* The MDA does not instruct the FDA to approve only the "best"
medical devices, or to determine whether there are better or more effective
devices available. 240 To the contrary, if a device meets the statutory tests of
oversight, and that a broad interpretation of the MDA's preemptive scope would not further this
legislative goal.").
237. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000) (Price-Anderson Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34
(2000) (National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986); 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (Supp. 2004) (Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001).
238. See Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000).
239. See generally Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 228 (1999) ("Congress is unlikely to
intend any radical departures from past practice without making a point of saying so.").
240. Like many regulatory statutes, the MDA sets performance standards and does not impose
design standards. This choice reflects a growing preference for non-prescriptive regulation that
leaves the decision of how best to achieve statutory or regulation goals to the regulated entity. See
safety and efficacy, the FDA must approve it, even if there are better and
safer products on the market, and even if the FDA knows that the device's
design is not optimal. As the examples of recently-recalled products show,
faulty devices are approved by the FDA in spite of the rigorous pre-market
approval process.24'
* Devices are not "term limited." Devices are approved indefinitely.
Once they are on the market they are not subject to periodic review, and they
are not subject to withdrawal even if they are superseded by superior
products. The MDA presumes that the market, and not FDA regulation, will
weed out devices rendered obsolete by newer, safer, and more effective
ones.
* The MDA does not require adequate reporting of problems with
medical devices to the FDA; device manufacturers ordinarily file reports
annually and those reports are not made available to physicians or the
public.
2 4 2
* The MDA gives the FDA only limited authority to deal with defective
devices, and the FDA has invoked this authority sparingly. To order any
kind of relief, the agency must determine that the device is not simply
defective, but that it "presents an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to
generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies
for Health and Environmental Regulation, L. & Contemp. Prob., Summer 1983, at 159, 162-64. For
this reason, the presumption against preemption should be at its zenith when an agency's organic
statute directs the imposition of performance standards. In those instances, by definition, the
regulated entity retains a high degree of freedom in determining how best to meet the demands of
regulation, and thus it is unlikely that tort liability will interfere with, much less conflict with, federal
regulatory goals.
241. See, e.g., Abelson, supra note 235, at C5; Harder, supra note 235, at Fl.
242. The MDA gives the FDA discretion to mandate reporting on medical devices. 21 U.S.C. §
360i (2000); see also id. § 3601 (post-marketing surveillance authority). The FDA reporting
requirements are set forth in 21 C.F.R. Part 803, and recently were strengthened by the FDA,
effective July 2005. See Medical Device Reporting, 70 Fed. Reg. 9516 (Feb. 28, 2005) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 803). Under these requirements, manufacturers have thirty days to report a
defect that may be life threatening, and five days to report a defect that "necessitates remedial action
to prevent an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health." Id. at 9520. "Baseline"
reports that describe the number of devices sold and the performance of the devices are filed
annually, and most of those reports are withheld because they are considered confidential business
information. Id. at 9522; see Barry Meier, F.D.A. Will Not Release Some Data on Heart Devices,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at C3 (reporting that the FDA rejected a request under the Freedom of
Information Act to obtain medical device reports); Barry Meier, A Choice for the Heart; It's Easier
to Get Data on a Car Than on a Medical Device, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at Cl (noting
complaints by physicians that, in contrast to pharmaceutical products, there is no comparative data
available on the safety, effectiveness, or reliability of medical devices). Manufacturers are required
to report device malfunctions that, if they recur, could lead to serious injury or death. Records and
Reports on Devices, 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(1)(B); Medical Device Reporting, 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a)(2)
(2005) (requiring manufacturers to file a report within thirty days when a device it has manufactured
"malfunctioned and such device or similar device marketed by the manufacturer would be likely to
cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, if the malfunction were to recur"). Manufacturers
must also report, within five working days, events that suggest a "trend" requiring remedial action to
protect public helath. Medical Device Reporting, 21 C.F.R. § 803.53(a) (2005). And manufacturers
are required to report "promptly" any "correction" of a medical device undertaken by the
manufacturer to "reduce a risk to health posed by the device .... 21 U.S.C. § 360i(f)(1)(A); 21
C.F.R. § 806.10(a)(1).
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public health., 243 As best as I could determine, the FDA has never exercised
its power to recall a defective medical device, although it has used the threat
of a recall to force device manufacturers to withdraw defective devices from
the market.
The point of this list is not to critique the MDA. Rather, it is to show
that the regulatory screen erected by the MDA is far from airtight. Devices
that do more harm than good will continue to reach consumers. Even a well-
intentioned and diligent FDA cannot prevent dangerous and defective
devices from entering the marketplace and doing serious harm to consumers.
Furthermore, once the FDA approval process has unleashed a dangerous
device into the market, the FDA's authority to address that situation is far
from comprehensive. 44 All of this was known to Congress when it enacted
the MDA, and these limitations strongly support the proposition that
Congress intended the MDA to operate against the backdrop of existing tort
law, which provides an independent and important discipline on the market.
The same critique could be applied with equal force to any of the
regulatory statutes that are now preemption battlegrounds. Indeed, if
243. 21 U.S.C. § 360h. Once the FDA determines that a device "presents an unreasonable risk of
substantial harm to the public health," it may require device manufacturers to notify health care
providers and device recipients of the defect. Id. § 360h(a). In non-implanted devices, the agency
can also order the company to repair, replace, or provide a refund. Id. § 360h(b). The agency also
has authority, added to the MDA in 1992, to order a recall of defective devices after (1) finding that
"there is a reasonable probability that a device intended for human use would cause serious, adverse
health consequences or death," and (2) "providing [the device manufacturer] an opportunity for an
informal hearing." Id. § 360h(e)(l), (2). Insofar as I can determine, the FDA has never exercised its
authority under this provision of the Act, although it has apparently threatened to invoke this
provision to press manufacturers to undertake "voluntary" recalls. But the FDA generally relies on
market forces to prompt the recall of dangerous, defective devices. Typical is the tragic case of
Bjork-Shiley heart valves. Between 1979 and 1986, Shiley, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Pfizer, Inc., manufactured a human-implant heart valve known as the Bjork-Shiley convexo/concave
heart valve ("valve"). See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 147 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
"Somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 of the valves were implanted in patients .... " Id. By
1992, approximately 450 of these valves had fractured resulting in approximately 300 deaths. Id.
The valves were continuing to fracture at a rate considerably higher than comparable valves, due to a
serious design defect. Id. As a result, hundreds of heart patients had to undergo risky surgery to
explant the defective valve and replace it with a safer one. Id. The Shiley valves were withdrawn by
the company only after years of litigation, which culminated in a massive class action settlement. Id.
at 147-48.
244. These concerns put aside perennial problems that all federal safety agencies have with under-
funding and under-staffing. The FDA, which regulates one-quarter of the American economy,
employs only around 9,000 people nationwide. Food and Drug Administration,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacon/fdal01/sld0l5.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2005). In addition to
medical devices, these employees are responsible, among other things, for reviewing new drug
applications, monitoring the safety of drugs on the market, inspecting drug manufacturing facilities,
inspecting virtually all of the non-meat food products sold in this country (including imports),
inspecting food processing facilities, regulating dietary supplements, overseeing the safety of the
blood supply, and regulating biological and radiological products, as well as veterinary medicines
and cosmetics, Id.
anything, the protections built into FIFRA,2 45 the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act,2 46 and the Federal Boat Safety Act2 47 are less
comprehensive than those in the MDA. All of these statutes embody trade-
offs between public health concerns and the need to ensure a competitive
marketplace that rewards innovation and quality. None of these statutes,
standing alone, imposes a discipline on the marketplace sufficient to ensure
a reasonable margin of safety, and nowhere in those statutes or their
legislative histories does Congress suggest otherwise. These factors suggest
that Congress enacted these statutes with the understanding that the
background discipline of tort law would remain undisturbed.
VI. CONCLUSION
One way to bring the debate over preemption into sharp focus is to
return for a moment to the tragic and premature death of Joshua Oukrop. 2
48
Assuming that the FDA's approach prevails, Joshua's family has no recourse
at all; his death will be a tragedy marked only by the personal loss to his
family and friends. Any claim his family might want to bring against the
device's manufacturer will be preempted. The manufacturer will escape
financial responsibility to Joshua's family. And because the FDA rarely
imposes financial sanctions against device manufacturers, it is likely that the
manufacturer will incur no financial loss for the defect in the device that
caused Joshua's death.249 Under the FDA's approach, the company has only
weak financial incentives to withdraw a defective device from the market,
little incentive to make changes to improve the device's safety, and almost
no incentive to warn patients and physicians of possible defects. To be sure,
new and better devices will, over time, supersede older and less efficient
ones; but that is a consequence of market forces and not regulation. Nor do
regulatory consequences necessarily flow from marketing a defective device.
As noted above, the manufacturer had a duty to report Joshua's death to the
FDA, 250 a duty it apparently discharged.25 ' Yet according to press reports,
245. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
246. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (2000).
247. Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971,46 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1484 (2000).
248. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
249. The FDA does have criminal and civil sanctions available to punish manufacturers who fail
to submit timely reports or otherwise fail to meet their regulatory obligations. The Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act contains a provision governing "penalties," which permits the imposition of criminal
and civil sanctions, including monetary penalities, for engaging in what the Act characterizes as
"prohibited acts." See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) (setting forth
"prohibited acts"); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333 (setting forth penalties
for commiting prohibited acts). Recent press reports suggest that the FDA may have launched a
criminal investigation to determine whether Guidant violated any law in the way it discharged its
reporting duties with regard to this defibrillator. See Barry Meier, Guidant Case May Involve Crime
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at C1.
250. 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(1)(A) (2000).
251. It is unclear whether the manufacturer reported earlier-detected failures with this device and
whether it brought the severity of the risk of the failures to the FDA's attention. According to one
press account, the manufacturer did submit reports of the device's malfunction to the FDA. But the
company nonetheless continued to sell this model even after it had developed an improved model
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although Guidant knew of the possible defect for three years prior to
Joshua's death, it did not alert doctors and patients until Joshua died.252 In
the meantime, nearly 25,000 of these devices were implanted in other
patients. 2 " And why not? Without the looming threat of tort liability, the
company had little incentive - economic or regulatory - to do
otherwise.254
Now assume that the FDA's preemption position is rejected, and that
state damage claims are available to Joshua's family. 255 They will likely
sue, and if they prevail, the manufacturer will bear financial responsibility to
the family. Moreover, the manufacturer will have powerful incentives to
monitor the performance of its devices and make improvements to respond
to possible imperfections and to keep pace with innovation. This dynamic is
not a product of regulation. It is a product of the tort system. As the Court
emphasized in Bates, private remedies that reinforce and strengthen federal
standards enhance, rather than hinder, the functioning of federal
regulation.256 State damages actions "may aid in the exposure of new
that did not pose a risk of short-circuiting. Barry Meier, F.D.A. Will Not Release Some Data on
Heart Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at B3. Nothing in the FDA's regulations appears to
forbid this conduct by the manufacturer. Cf. 21 C.F.R. § 806.10 (2005) (requiring manufacturers to
promptly report "corrections" made to medical devices, but not to remove uncorrected devices from
the marketplace or to discontinue their sale).
252. See, e.g., Barry Meier, New Report of Problems at Guidant, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at
Bl; Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Device Kept Flaw From Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at
Al.
253. Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Device Kept Flaw From Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005,
at Al.
254. To be fair to the company, it claims that the failure rate with this model defibrillator is on par
with, or lower than, the failure rates of comparable devices. Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Device
Kept Flaw From Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at A1. But the company's eventual recall of
the device, coupled with the announcement that it will pay for replacement surgery, suggests that the
company may be worried about a higher incidence of failures in the future. Barry Meier, New
Report of Problems at Guidant, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at B13; Barry Meier, Citing Flaws,
Maker Recalls Heart Devices, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at Al. Moreover, the company's
willingness to pay for replacement surgery suggests that the company may not be confident that
courts will find personal injury claims by patients preempted. Barry Meier, Guidant Agrees to Pay
for Defibrillator Replacements, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2005, at C2.
255. It is not far-fetched to suggest that with a robust tort system in place, Joshua might not have
died. Recall that Guidant waited several years before notifying patients and physicians that this
device contained a possible defect. Barry Meier, F.D.A. Refuses to Release Some Data on Heart
Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at B3. By that time, Guidant had produced a newer, defect-
free, defibrillator. Id. Given that Joshua was an otherwise young and healthy patient, Joshua and his
physician might well have decided that the risk of the device's failure outweighed the risk of
additional surgery to replace the Guidant defibrillator with a safer model. The right of patients and
physicians to make informed judgments about such matters would form the core of a failure to warn
case brought by Joshua's parents. But under a pro-preemption approach to the MDA, even though a
common-law failure to wam theory would likely parallel the FDA's reporting and notification
regulations, it would be preempted. One consequence of such an approach, of course, is that
manufacturers like Guidant have little economic incentive to notify patients and physicians of a
possible defect.
256. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 (2005).
dangers associated" with devices, may prompt manufacturers of the FDA to
decide that modifications are "required in light of the new information that
has been brought" to their attention by litigation, and may "provide
manufacturers with added dynamic incentives to continue to keep abreast of
all possible injuries stemming from use of their product so as to forestall
such actions through product improvement.,
257
As the Guidant defibrillator recall demonstrates, there are sound reasons
why the tort and regulatory systems operate in tandem and place separate,
albeit reinforcing, disciplines on the market. When functioning well, a
regulatory system prevents injury and ensures products on the market have a
favorable risk-reward profile. But the tort system is vital because far too
often there are gaps that our regulatory agencies - even those as effective
as the FDA - cannot fill. Perhaps in a perfect world one could expect the
FDA to have immediate access to data enabling it to pinpoint and solve
problems like a wiring flaw in a defibrillator, a defective lead in a
pacemaker, or faulty welds in heart valves (the defect with the Shiley
valve).258 But that would be a world where the FDA never lacks the
information, personnel, technical data and other resources needed to deal
immediately with emerging safety hazards; where the agency acts as soon as
it identifies a problem requiring a regulatory solution; where rules are
updated swiftly to reflect needed design changes, technological advances or
scientific knowledge; where companies quickly and candidly inform the
FDA about the problems they identify; and where regulatory decisions are
made free from political considerations - without pressure from regulated
industry, congressional committees and the White House and the Office of
Management and Budget. That is perhaps the world that some see, but it is
not the world observed by those who regularly work with regulatory
agencies.25 9 Nor is it the world that existed when Joshua Oukrop fell off his
bicycle and died because his defibrillator malfunctioned.
257. Id. (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
258. See supra notes 12, 243 and accompanying text (discussing the recall of defective Shiley
heart valves).
259. For an extended discussion of this point, see David C. Vladeck, Defending Courts: A Brief
Rejoinder to Professors Fried and Rosenberg, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 631, 640 (2002).
